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Recent Decisions
Administrative Law - Right To By-Pass Statutory
Remedy To Contest Validity Of Zoning Ordinance.
Richmark Realty Co. v. Whitlif, 226 Md. 273, 173 A. 2d 196
(1961). Appellant, wishing to build a filling station within
300 feet of a public park which construction was absolutely
prohibited by Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance (1958 ed.)
§ 37, secured the passage of an ordinance by the City
Council and Acting Mayor of Baltimore City waiving the
provisions of Sec. 37 with respect to his contemplated filling
station construction. Following this, the appellant's appli-
cation for permit and his preliminary plat were approved
by the necessary city agencies, and a construction permit
was issued without public notice or a hearing before the
Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals as required in
Secs. 38, 39. The appellee, after the passage of the ordi-
nance, filed a bill of complaint, which was amended after
the permit was issued, asking the equity court to pass a
decree ordering the appellant's permit revoked and can-
celed, enjoining the erection of the filling station, and de-
claring the special ordinance illegal and void. The appel-
lant answered, alleging as one of its defenses, that the
equity court could not assume jurisdiction because the
appellees had a special remedy provided by statute to
appeal to the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals and
their failure to exhaust this remedy precluded them from
seeking relief in the equity court. The lower court, noting
that appellant also had not followed the prescribed pro-
cedure, granted the relief requested by the appellee. On
appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in affirming the
decree, held that one may by-pass a special remedy pro-
vided by statute and seek relief in equity where the suit
attacks the constitutional validity of a zoning ordinance.
In its holding the Court recognized the principle that
generally one may not by-pass a special administrative
remedy provided by statute. Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md.
64, 81 A. 2d 226 (1951). But, where a constitutional ques-
tion is involved, one may by-pass an administrative remedy
and resort to equity in the first instance. Kahl v. Cons. Gas,
El. Lt. & Pwr. Co., 191 Md. 249, 60 A. 2d 754 (1948). How-
ever, where one attacks, on constitutional grounds, not the
zoning ordinance itself but its present applicability due
RECENT DECISIONS
to changes in circumstances, and a statutory remedy is pro-
vided, he must avail himself of it before seeking declaratory
relief. Baltimore v. Seabolt, 210 Md. 199, 123 A. 2d 207
(1956). For further information see 1 M.L.E. Administra-
tive Law and Procedure, §§ 5-8; DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE (1958) Vol. 3, §§ 20.04, 20.09; and, 75 A.L.R.
2d 168 (1961).
Appeal And Error - No Right Of Immediate Appeal
From A Ruling On A Pre-Indictment Motion To Suppress
Evidence. DiBella v. U. S. and U. S. v. Koenig, ...... U.S.
...... ,82 S. Ct. 654 (1962). These two cases involve the same
fundamental problem. In the first case DiBella was ar-
rested upon a charge of unlawful sale of narcotics. At the
time of his arrest certain drugs, equipment and cash were
seized from his apartment. Before indictment DiBella
filed a motion to suppress the evidentiary use of this prop-
erty, alleging unlawful search and seizure. After the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied
this motion, DiBella immediately appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit
held that the order denying the motion was a final decision
and thus appealable. In the second case Koenig was ar-
rested in Florida on a charge of robbing a federally insured
bank in Ohio. Before an indictment was filed in the
Southern District of Ohio, Koenig filed in a Florida federal
court a motion to suppress and return property seized
during arrest. After Koenig was returned to Ohio where
he was indicted, the Florida federal court granted his mo-
tion. The government appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. The Court, in dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction, said the order appealed from is interlocutory
in a criminal case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in both cases to resolve the conflict among the circuits.
The Court resolved the conflict in favor of the Fifth Circuit
by holding that a ruling on a pre-indictment motion to
suppress the evidentiary use, in a federal criminal case, of
property allegedly obtained by unreasonable search and
seizure is not a "final decision" but rather an interlocutory
order and thus not subject to immediate appellate review.
Appeals from all "final decisions" of the district courts
of the United States are within the jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals. 72 STAT. 348 [28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1949)].
The Court in the principal cases recognized situations
where interlocutory orders are immediately appealable;
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however, most of these exceptions to the "final decision"
rule are applicable in civil cases only. DiBella v. U. S.,
supra, p. 657. Prior to the decision in the instant cases,
there were decisions in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits which
were clearly contrary to the rule of the Second Circuit.
See, United States v. Williams, 227 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir.
1955), and Zacarias v. United States, 261 F. 2d 416 (5th
Cir. 1958). In cases preceding the decision in the instant
cases, the Supreme Court had denied appeals from post-
indictment motions on the ground such orders were inter-
locutory. See, Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957)
and Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221 (1929). See also,
1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 5, § 1 ["final decision" rule] and
4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 5 [illegally obtained evidence].
For further reference see 2 M.L.E., Appeals, §§ 31-35; 7
M.L.E., Criminal Law, §§ 533, 576 and 156 A.L.R. 1207
(1945).
Evidence - Argument Suggesting Compensation For
Pain And Suffering On Per Diem Basis Allowed. Eastern
Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 177 A. 2d
701 (1962) reaffirmed (on rehearing), ...... Md ....... , 180 A.
2d 681 (1962) (three judges dissenting). The plaintiff, a
painter, was injured when he came into contact with low
voltage wires belonging to the defendant, which were not
believed to be energized, and he brought suit. In his clos-
ing argument to the jury, the plaintiff's counsel suggested
that five dollars per hour would be a reasonable compen-
sation for the pain and suffering due to plaintiff's injuries.
The trial judge refused to grant the defendant's motion to
instruct the jurors to disregard the plaintiff's per diem
argument, and after a verdict of $12,500 was returned by
the jury for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Although
the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
because the lower court failed to give the proper instruc-
tions concerning the degree of care owed by the defendant,
it upheld the ruling allowing the use of the per diem
formula as a reasonable and sane method of guiding the
jury in determining damages; however, the court pro-
vided that when this formula is used, it should be accom-
panied by instructions cautioning the jury that this argu-
ment is not evidence and that the jury alone should deter-
mine the proper verdict. Two judges dissented on this
point, primarily on the grounds that there is no evidentiary
basis for allowing a per diem estimate of the value of pain
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and suffering, and thus, jurors could easily be led into
awarding excessive verdicts by the use of mathematical
formulas not based upon factual evidence. Cf. Harper v.
Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A. 2d 661 (1961).
From the jurisdictions in which the per diem argument
has been discussed, three general views have emerged:
(1) that the argument should not be permitted as a matter
of law, Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A. 2d 713, 60
A.L.R. 2d 1331 (1958); Henne v. Balick, 51 Del. 369, 146 A.
2d 394 (1958); (2) that counsel has a right to use the
per diem formula, 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy,
221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); Flaherty v. Minneapolis
& St. Louis Railway Co., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W. 2d 633
(1958), but Cf. Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault
Ste. M. R. Co., 224 Minn. 1, 68 N.W. 2d 873 (1955); (3) that
admission or exclusion of the per diem formula is in the
discretion of the trial judge. Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d
82 (Fla. App. 1959). For further discussion, see 60 A.L.R.
2d 1347 (1958), 19 Ohio St. L.J. 780 (1958), 14 U. of Fla. L.
Rev. 189 (1961), and O'Connor, Some Anti-Biotic Thoughts
in an Anti-Botta World, Daily Record, February 4, 1961.
Negotiable Instruments - Drawee Bank Not Liable To
Payee For Cashing Forged Checks. Anschutz v. Central
Nat. Bank of Columbus, 173 Neb. 60, 112 N.W. 2d 545
(1961). The drawer handed two checks to his agent to
deliver to the payee. The agent forged the payee's name
and cashed the checks. The drawee bank paid the checks
to subsequent endorsers and charged the drawer's account.
The payee sued the drawee bank for the amount of the
checks on the alternate grounds of contract or conversion.
The defendant's demurrer was sustained and the plaintiff
elected to stand on his petition, which was dismissed. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that, under
4 NEB. REV. STAT. 1943 (1958 Reissue) § 62-1, 189 (N.I.L.§ 189), in the absence of acceptance or certification of the
checks by the drawee bank, there is no privity of contract
between the payee and the drawee bank and the payee can-
not maintain an action of contract against the drawee bank.
The Court also denied recovery for conversion on the
ground that to permit such a recovery would merely be a
circumvention of the N.I.L. See also 4 NEB. REV. STAT. 1943
(1958 Reissue) § 62-1, 132 (N.I.L. § 132).
Prior to the enactment of the N.I.L., some courts held
that the issuance of a check operated as an assignment of
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the drawer's funds to the payee; thus the payee was in
privity of contract with the drawee bank and could main-
tain an action in contract against the drawee bank for
funds paid on a forged endorsement. Famner v. Smith, 31
Neb. 407, 47 N.W. 632 (1891). Other courts, however,
adopted a contrary view. First Nat. Bank of Washington,
D.C. v. Whitman, 94 U.S. 343 (1876). Moses v. The Franklin
Bank of Baltimore, 34 Md. 574 (1871). The N.I.L., enacted
in Maryland in 1898, has been interpreted as adopting the
latter view. 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 13, § 148. See also
National Union Bank of Md. v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md.
449, 129 A. 668 (1925) and 5 U.L.A. § 189, Note 1.
In denying recovery on the alternate theory of con-
version, the Court, in the instant case, relied upon the
reasoning of the dissenting opinion in State v. First Nat.
Bank of Albuquerque, 38 N.M. 225, 30 P. 2d 728, 733 (1934)
to the effect that to permit such a recovery would merely
provide "an ingenious legal escort to conduct the true
owner of a check to a judgment which . . . the Negotiable
Instruments Law prohibits." Courts granting recovery
for conversion usually do so on the theory that the drawee
bank has taken the check without the consent of the payee,
thus the conversion is of the check, not the funds. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co. v. Citizen's & People's Nat. Bank of
Pensacola, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917). Under the pro-
posed Uniform Commercial Code, payment by a drawee
on a forged endorsement does amount to a conversion of
the instrument [U.C.C. § 3-419 (1, c.)].
The Nebraska court points out that the rule which it
adopts does not relieve a drawee bank from responsibility
to the drawer for cashing a check on a forged endorsement,
but merely denies relief to the payee against the drawee
bank unless it has certified or accepted the check. For
further reference see Atlantic Trust Co. v. Keystone In-
demnity Co., 150 Md. 470, 133 A. 319 (1926); 1 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 13, § 153; 4 M.L.E. 101, Banks and Trust Com-
panies, §§ 134, 137; 137 A.L.R. 874 (1942); BRrrroN, BiLLs
AND NOTES (2d ed. 1961) § 146; U.C.C., §§ 3-409, 3-410.
Real Property - Exculpatory Clause In A Lease Not
Invalid As Against Public Policy. Eastern Avenue Cor-
poration v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 180 A. 2d 486 (1962).
The plaintiff, tenant, obtained a judgment against the de-
fendant, landlord, in the lower court, for injuries sustained
when she fell over a hump in a parking lot maintained by
256 [VOL. XXII
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the defendant for the use of the tenants of its building.
The plaintiff had covenanted in the lease that the defendant
would not be liable for any injuries to the plaintiff's person
or property or to any visitor on the premises which were
sustained because of the defendant's failure to keep the
demised premises in repair, or from any other cause. The
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court and held the exculpatory clause was not invalid
as against public policy.
The Court was faced with a problem of first impression
in reaching its decision; however, in State of Maryland v.
Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F. 2d 414, 417 (C.A.
4th 1949), the Federal Court assumed the validity of an
exculpatory clause in Maryland. The majority of the
jurisdictions appear to be in accord with the decision
reached in the instant case. 6A ComiWN, CONTRACTS (1962)
§ 1472, pp. 600-601 and 175 A.L.R. 8, 83 (1948). However,
a few jurisdictions have either found such clauses invalid
as against public policy or have accomplished this result
by an appropriate statute. Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H.
265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941), 6 Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 186, § 15
(1955) and Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1959) ch.
80, § 15a. It remains open to question whether the Mary-
land Court of Appeals would hold that a broad exculpatory
clause, similar to the one involved in the instant case, would
relieve the lessor from liability to third persons. However,
see Goldberg v. Wunderlich, 248 Ky. 798, 59 S.W. 2d 1018(1933) and 6 WILISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938)
§ 1751C, p. 4969, fn. 4. For further information see, 1
American Law of Property (1952) § 3.78, p. 346; 6 WILLIs-
TON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) § 1751C; and 175 A.L.R. 8
(1948).
Taxation - Taxable Interest Of Surviving Joint Owner
Of Savings Account. Mitchell v. Register of Wills for
Baltimore City, 227 Md. 305, 176 A. 2d 763 (1962). Claimant
and her brother held a savings account in the following
form: "Sadie Mitchell in trust for self and Charles R.
Mitchell, joint owners, subject to the order of Sadie
Mitchell during the life of both, the balance at the death
of either to belong to the survivor." Mitchell v. Register
of Wills for Baltimore City, supra, p. 307. At the death of
Charles Mitchell, the Register of Wills assessed an in-
heritance tax on one-half of the balance of the account,
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pursuant to 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 81, §§ 150, 151, which
claimant paid. Claimant filed a claim for a refund, which
was rejected by the Register of Wills and the rejection was
affirmed on appeal to the Maryland Tax Court. The Balti-
more City Court affirmed the decision of the Maryland Tax
Court, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
claimant and her brother were equitable joint owners of
the funds held by her in trust and that the joint tenancy
clause of § 151 applied in determining her taxable interest
in the fund transferred to her at the death of her brother.
Claimant's contention that there was no taxable bene-
ficial interest in the account that would pass to her on her
brother's death was rejected by the Court on the basis of
Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 (1899), which
held that a transfer of an interest in a bank account takes
effect solely by reason of the declaration of trust. The
claimant's interest was twofold, first, she was a trustee
and second, she was one of two equitable joint owners.
Although the claimant reserved the power to withdraw all
or part of the fund, a revocation would not occur until
all the funds were withdrawn, and that portion which re-
mained would be subject to the terms of the trust. Ghingher
v. Fanseen, 166 Md. 519, 172 A. 75 (1934). Thus, when
claimant opened the account, an equitable one-half of the
amount deposited vested in decedent, even though claimant
retained control over the account; and on decedent's death,
his interest passed to claimant and was subject to the
inheritance tax.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, as interpreted, claim-
ant would not have been taxed, as a transfer which is
subject to the power of revocation is not complete until
the power of revocation is terminated. Estate of Sanford
v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). Furthermore, even if the
transfer were complete, claimant would not be taxed since
the Federal tax is based upon the proportions of the jointly
held property contributed by the decedent and the sur-
vivor. Thus, where the survivor was the original owner
of all the property, no part of its value is included in dece-
dent's gross estate. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, § 2040
(26 U.S.C. § 2040). See also 28 Am. Jur. Inheritance, Estate
and Gift Taxes, § 231 (1959-Revised Volume). For further
reference see: 21 Op. Att'y. Gen. 768 (1936); 21 M.L.E. 590,
Trusts, § 282; 3 Md. L. Rev. 109; C.C.H., 1 Estate and Gift
Tax Reporter, Joint Interests, § 20.2040-1(c) (3).
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Torts - Exemplary Damages Awarded Against Dis-
criminatory Air Carrier. Wills v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Plaintiff, an at-
torney holding a tourist class airline ticket, having fully
complied with all passenger regulations, was refused per-
mission by defendant's agent to board his flight which it
had oversold. The evidence showed that plaintiff, although
having priority on this flight, was removed in favor of a
first class passenger who was then seated in the tourist
section. This act resulted in a four and one-half hour
delay to the plaintiff and the expenditure of $1.54 for a
telephone call. Petitioner brought this action under § 404(b)
of the Civil Aeronautics Acts of 1938 [49 U.S.C.A. § 484(b),
as amended, § 1374(b) (1958)] which forbids any air
carrier to discriminate unjustly against any person in any
manner, and he asked damages for breach of his passenger
contract, exemplary damages for defendant's wantonly
overselling space on this flight, and injunctive relief to
prevent future violations. The court awarded plaintiff
$1.54 compensatory and $5,000 exemplary damages, but
denied injunctive relief because of plaintiff's failure to
resort to the administrative procedures stated in the Civil
Aeronautics Act [49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1482, 1486(a)]. In so
holding, the court relied on a previous case, Fitzgerald v.
Pan American World Airways, 229 F. 2d 499 (2d Cir.
1956) (dealing with discrimination as to race in air travel),
which recognized the necessity for a civil action to com-
plement the criminal provisions of the Civil Aeronautics
Act [49 U.S.C.A. § 1472(a)]. The latter was viewed as
creating a federal cause of action in favor of those for
whose protection the statute was enacted. In the instant
case the court went beyond the holding of the Fitzgerald
case by awarding exemplary damages to vindicate the civil
rights of an airline passenger whose rights were willfully
or wantonly violated. The result was accomplished by
drawing an analogy to the Civil Rights Legislation [42
U.S.C.A. § 1983] where an express right of redress had
been interpreted so as to allow the recovery of punitive
damages. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
101 F. 2d 774, 789 (3rd Cir. 1939), mod'd on other grounds,
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
The instant court's broad interpretation of the purpose
section of the Civil Aeronautics Act [49 U.S.C.A. § 1302
(c)], as warranting the recovery of exemplary damages,
creates a serious problem for the airlines. Recognizing this,
the major airlines recently proposed to the Civil Aeronau-
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tics Board a standardized system of fines levied against a
discriminatory airline which inures to the benefit of pas-
sengers whose rights have been violated. This agreement,
which was subsequently ratified by all the carriers and
accepted by the Board (CAB Orders Nos. E-18064 and
E-18389, not published in the Federal Register) goes a long
way in settling the discrimination problem presented in
the Wills case.
Torts - Municipal Liability For Police Dog Bites.
Barr v. District of Columbia, 202 F. Supp. 260 (1962). A
District of Columbia police dog, trained to attack people
only in certain situations, without provocation leaped a
small fence surrounding his master's house where the dog
was kept during off-duty hours, and attacked plaintiff
passerby. In an action by the plaintiff against the District,
the defendant demurred. The District court held that
plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action since the
negligent maintenance of a dog under such minimum
restraints as would allow it to attack innocent passers-by
on public ways was not in performance of a governmental
function.
The general rule is that municipal corporations are
liable for negligence in the commission or omission of
proprietary functions but immune from liability in gov-
ernmental activities. See, 2 Harper and James, Torts
(1956) § 29.6; Prosser, Torts (2nd ed. 1955) § 109, and
60 A.L.R. 2d 1198 (1958). Maryland is in accord with the
general rule. 16 M.L.E. 232, Municipal Corporations,§ 301. The general rule has been subjected to considerable
criticism; and the instant opinion states, "The historic
concept of sovereign immunity is waning." See generally,
3 Md. L. Rev. 159 (1939). For further information see,
20 A.B.A. J. 747, 748, fn. 1 (1934). In keeping with the
criticism of the rule, some states have enacted statutes
subjecting the municipality to liability for negligence in
the performance of what would normally be considered
governmental activities. See e.g., N.Y. General Municipal
Law §§ 50a and 50d, and Wisconsin Statutes Annotated
(1957) § 81.15. For a discussion of statutory waiver of
tort immunity in Maryland see 20 Md. L. Rev. 353 (1960).
Whereas some jurisdictions, which lack a specific statutory
provision, avoid the effect of immunity by finding a par-
ticular activity non-governmental [See, Prosser, Torts
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(2nd ed. 1955) § 109, p. 775]; the instant court obviated
the ill effects of the general rule by distinguishing between
torts committed while the municipal officials were "on
duty" and those committed when they were "off duty".
For further reference see, 4 Restatement, Torts (1939)
§ 887 comment (c); 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
(3d ed. 1950) §§ 53.01-53.04; 34 Yale' L.J. 229 (1925);
Davis, Administrative Law Text (1959) Ch. 25.
Workmen's Compensation - Average Weekly Wages
Under Workmen's Compensation Act. Crowner v. Balti-
more United Butchers Association, 226 Md. 606, 175 A. 2d 7
(1961). Claimant was employed full-time as a laborer by
Armour and Company in their Baltimore plant where he
averaged $90.80 per week as wages. He also had a com-
pletely distinct employment as a laborer for the Baltimore
United Butchers Association one Saturday per month for
which he was paid $15.00 per day. While engaged in his
Saturday employment he sustained a compensable injury.
The Workmen's Compensation Commission awarded him
compensation based on $3.46 as his "average weekly wage"
computed on the basis of the $15.00 per month earned from
the employment in which he suffered the injury ($15.00
x 12 mos. : 52 wks.). Claimant appealed, contending that
his average weekly wages should encompass wages re-
ceived from both jobs. The Court of Appeals in upholding
the Commission's action, held that under 8 Md. Code
(1957) Art. 101, § 36 and § 67(8), the claimant's average
weekly wage did not comprehend wages from both jobs
but only wages earned on the job where he was injured.
The instant case is the first construction of the Maryland
statute on the question at issue. In Picanardi v. Emerson
Hotel Co., 135 Md. 92, 108 A. 483 (1919) and Stevenson v.
Hill, 171 Md. 572, 189 A. 910 (1937), the Court reasoned
that average weekly wages should be calculated on the
bases used for determining premiums and rates of insur-
ance that are paid by the employer. Of controlling im-
portance in the Court's decision upon the question is its
interpretation of the legislative intent in drafting Sec.
67(8), defining average weekly wage. The Court finds the
legislature intended the phrase with its limiting provisions
to mean the employee's wages received from his employer
1962]
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and not to mean all sources of wages, both regular and
part-time.
The Maryland statute appears to be unique in its defini-
tion of average weekly wage. The question at issue has
therefore not been presented in the same light in other
jurisdictions. Generally see 58 A.L.R. 1395 (1929); 30
A.L.R. 1000"(1924).
